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Richard A. Neufeld" and Drainage Issues in the Atlantic
Robert G. Grant, Q.C.'" Canada Offshore Petroleum
Industry
In this article, the authors examine the issue of drainage in the Atlantic Canada
offshore. The offshore statutory regimes for production of oil and gas, together
with the common law, are analyzed for their approaches to dealing with drainage
issues. In addition, the law of drainage in Alberta is comprehensively reviewed
to provide some guidance as to how the law of drainage may develop in Atlantic
Canada.
Dans cet article, les auteurs se penchent sur le probl~me du drainage dans le
secteur p~trolier extrac6tier sur la c6te Atlantique. Ils analysent les lois et
r~glements r~gissant I'exploitation p~trolibre et gazibre extrac6tiere ainsi que la
common law pour faire le point sur les approches pr~conis~es. De plus, ils se
livrent a un examen approfondi de la loi sur le drainage de I'Alberta pour cemer
les grandes orientations que pourrait prendre la loi concemant le drainage au
Canada Atlantique.
* Fraser Milner Casgrain, Calgary, with assistance of Gregory Moores.
** Stewart McKelvey Stirling Scales, Halifax, with assistance of John Hope.
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Introduction
In recent years, the Atlantic Canada offshore has evolved from a frontier
region of speculative oil and gas exploration to an area of significant
commercial production. Increased knowledge of the offshore reserves
coupled with the success of producing ventures has propelled interest and
activities connected with further exploration and development. These
increased activities will give rise to the emergence of legal issues
prevalent in regions having a mature oil and gas industry. These include
issues relating to drainage. Drainage refers to "the migration of oil or gas
within a reservoir towards areas of lower pressure which are the result of
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production from wells in that reservoir."' The legal problem caused by
the physical act of drainage is the balancing of the rights of persons having
interests in the reservoir.
The statutory regimes for the production of oil and gas in offshore
Atlantic Canada do not provide a comprehensive regime for dealing with
legal issues associated with drainage. In the absence of judicial or
administrative decisions concerning the legislation, there are a number of
uncertainties as to how drainage issues will be resolved in the offshore.
An analysis of the legal rights of persons affected by drainage in the
Atlantic Canada offshore must begin with a review of the common law.
Some guidance may be gained, as well, from well-developed jurisprudence
arising out of legislation in Alberta, where a mature oil and gas industry
exists. Comparisons respecting the law of drainage in the Atlantic Canada
offshore with that of Alberta must carefully consider the different
statutory regimes under which a person acquires the rights to produce oil
and gas and the substantially higher costs and risks of drilling wells
offshore rather than on land.2
I. Common Law: Rule of Capture
Because of the inherent migratory nature of oil and gas, a landowner
cannot produce oil or gas from a common reservoir without displacing or
draining some of the resource from under his neighbour's property.3 This
problem of drainage has plagued the oil and gas industry for as long as the
industry has existed. Under the common law, drainage was governed by
the rule of capture, as enunciated by the Privy Council in Borys v.
Canadian Pacific Railway and Imperial Oil Limited.4 Under this rule, if
a producer, in the course of draining the oil and gas from under its
1. C.D. Hunt & A.R. Lucas, Canada Energy Law Service, looseleaf (Scarborough: Carswell,
1998) at 30-3025.
2. For an overview of the legal structure of land rights in Saskatchewan, British Columbia and
Manitoba see Hunt & Lucas, ibid., at 122-38.
3. F. Pilcher, "Oil and Gas: H.B. 1221: Protection of Correlative Rights in the Absence of
Waste" (t987) 40 Okla. L. Rev. 127 at 129.
4. [1953] A.C. 217,7 W.W.R. (N.S.) 546, [1953] 2 D.L.R. 65, [1953] 2 W.L.R. 224, [1953] 1
All E.R. 452 (P.C.) [hereinafter Borys]. The rule of capture as stated in Borys has been further
commented on by the Canadian courts. For a further review of the rule of capture please see
Anderson v. Amoco Canada Oil & Gas (1998), 63 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1, 225 A.R. 277, [1999] 3
W.W.R. 255 (Q.B.); Prism Petroleum v. Omega Hydrocarbons (1994),18 Alta. L.R. (3d) 225,
149 A.R. 177,63 W.A.C. 177, [1994] 6 W.W.R. 585 (C.A.); and Lickatz v. Magna Petroleums
(1994), 160 A.R. 193 (Q.B.) [hereinafter Lickatz].
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property, recovers oil and gas which has filtered over from an adjoining
property, the owner of the adjoining property has no remedy against the
producer apart from the self-help remedy of drilling its own well. The
owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil and gas produced from
wells on its land, even though part of such oil and gas migrated from
adjoining lands.5
The rule of capture applies equally to those who own the land and those
who lease it. Thus, even if land is leased for the purpose of producing the
oil or gas, lessees only receive that oil or gas reduced to their possession,
regardless of what quantities of oil and gas were in fact under the land at
the time of the lease.6
Both the Canadian and American courts have recognized the rule of
capture. Unlike their Canadian counterparts, American courts have
developed a series of exceptions to the rule. Further, they have established
correlative rights for the owners of property interests in the production of
oil and gas .7 In Canada, legislation and case law developed from the rule
have been used to settle the interests of persons affected by drainage.*
The rule of capture has the potential to cause great inefficiencies in the
oil and gas industry. It encourages producers to produce and capture as
much of the resource as possible, as quickly as possible, which can lead
to waste. Waste can be divided into two subgroups: physical and
economic waste.9 Physical waste is the reduction of the total recoverable
hydrocarbons from the oil or gas reservoir.' Over-utilization of a
reservoir will also lead to significant physical waste. The result of having
too many wells in place is that a smaller percentage of the oil or gas that
exists in the reservoir will be recovered. During the production of oil and
gas, the natural migration of the oil or gas is towards the producing well.
5. R.E. Pelzer& R. A. Lehodey "Horizontal Drilling: Regulatory and Contractual Implications"
(1992) 30 Alta. L. Rev. 272 at 278.
6. J. B. Ballem, The Oil and Gas Lease in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1999) at 106.
7. Pilcher, supra note 3 at 131. See also K. Wilson, "Conservation Acts and Correlative
Rights: Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?" (1989) 35 Rocky Mt. Min. Law Inst. 181 at § 18.01
to § 18.02 and W.R. Richards, T.A. Mitchell & M. S. Johnson, "Oil and Gas Conservation in
Utah After Cowling: The Law of Capture Receives a New Lease on Life" (1994) 14 J. Energy,
Nat. Res. & Envtl. L. 1 at 2-9 for a review of the American approach to correlative rights.
8. This effect can be seen through mandatory pooling agreements. See N. Bankes, "Pooling
Agreements in Canadian Oil and Gas Law" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 493 at 494-99. Also see
Lickatz, supra note 4, for judicial interpretation of the retroactive effect of legislation on the
rule of capture.
9. J. Lowe, Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell (Minnesota: West Publishing Co.,1995) at 16.
10. R.C. Maxwell et al., Cases and Materials on the Law of Oil and Gas, 6th ed. (Westbury,
Foundation Press Inc., 1992) at 841.
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If the oil or gas is dissipated among too many wells or too quickly, oil and
gas may be left in the formation.'1 If oil or gas is produced more slowly,
using the appropriate number of wells, a greater percentage of the oil or
gas may be recovered, albeit over a longer period of time.'
Economic waste is the production of oil or gas in excess of the
reasonable market demand. 3 Over-production of oil or gas causes the
market to be flooded with the commodity and thus causes the price of oil
and gas to drop significantly. Physical and economic waste in the oil and
gas industry have resulted in increased production costs and lower market
prices for the resource. 4 Legislation to prevent waste has addressed the
issue in two ways: by making the practice of wasteful production illegal,
and by encouraging or requiring producers to enter into pooling and
unitization agreements. 5
II. Regulatory Regime in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland
The federal government passed the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic
Accord Implementation Act'6 in 1987, followed by the Canada-
Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act
in 1988.17 Nova Scotia and Newfoundland passed mirror legislation to
reflect the federal legislation. 8 The Nova Scotia Accord Act and the
Newfoundland Accord Act contain the same legislative approach to the
regulation of waste, pooling of resources and mandatory unitization of
reservoirs. 19
Under the Accord Acts there are established as governing agencies in
the respective offshore areas the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum
Board and the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (the
Boards). 20 Thejurisdiction of these Boards is wide-ranging, and includes
11. Lowe, supra note 9 at 16.
12. Ibid.
13. Maxwell etal., supra note 12 at 841.
14. Lowe, supra note 9 at 17.
15. A.R. Lucas & C.D. Hunt, Oil and Gas Law in Canada (Scarborough: Carswell, 1990) at 7.
While the focus of this article is on the use of pooling and unitization, there are also other
techniques which are used to prevent wasteful production, including prohibitions on concurrent
production of oil and gas caps, prescriptions for oil/gas ratios, and rateable take of gas orders.
16. S.C. 197, c. 3 [hereitafter Newfoundland Accord Act].
17. S.C. 1988, c. 28 [hereinafter Nova Scotia Accord Act].
18. Canada-NewfoundlandAtlanticAccordImplementation (Newfoundland)Act, S.N. 1986,
c. 37 and the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation
(Nova Scotia) Act, S.N.S. 1987, c. 3.
19. We refer to the Nova Scotia AccordAct and the NewfoundlandAccordAct together as the
Accord Acts. All citations refer to the federal versions of the legislation.
20. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 17, s. 9(1); NewfoundlandAccord Act, supra note 16, s.
9(1).
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thejurisdiction to deal with issues related to resource management.2 For
the purpose of carrying out its duties, each Board has established an Oil
and Gas Committee (Committee) which is empowered to hold inquiries,
hear appeals, make orders and give direction with regard to the production
of oil and gas.22 Further, each Board has appointed a Chief Conservation
Officer (Officer) 3 whose duties include overseeing the prevention of
waste.
1. Interests in Offshore Licences
The Accord Acts establish an interest regime involving categories of
licences which provide the holders with different rights and obligations.
Licence holders are entitled to exercise these rights exclusively for the
offshore area to which their licence applies. Interests are acquired in the
Crown reserve areas of the offshore, generally through a competitive call
for bids system administered by the Board.24 Under an exploration
licence, the holder has:
(1) the right to explore for and the exclusive right to drill for
petroleum in the licence area,
(2) the exclusive right to develop the licence area to produce
petroleum, and
(3) the exclusive right to apply for a production licence.2 1
A significant discovery licence confers the same rights as an
exploration licence. It is restricted to the area which the Board
has declared to be a significant discovery, that is, in respect of
which the Board has reasonable grounds to believe that the
significant discovery may extend. The holder of a significant
discovery licence may be subject to Board orders requiring the
drilling of wells.26
Where the Board has made a declaration of commercial discovery, the
licence holder is entitled to receive a production licence. In addition to
the rights conferred upon the holders of exploration and significant
discovery licences, the holders of production licences receive the exclusive
21. M. Harrington et al., "Emerging Issues in East Coast Oil and Gas Development" (1997)
35 Alta. L. Rev. 269 at 274.
22. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 17, ss. 145-49; Newfoundland Accord Act, supra
note 16, ss. 141-45.
23. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 144; Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 140.
24. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 61; Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 58.
25. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 68; Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 65.
26. Nova Scotia AccordAct, ibid., ss. 74,75,79; NewfoundlandAccordAct, ibid., ss. 71, 72,76.
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right to produce petroleum for the licence area and title to the petroleum
soproduced.27 A Board's intended declaration of commercial or significant
discovery may be subject to a hearing before the Committee.28
In addition to these licences, a person wishing to explore for, drill for,
produce or transport petroleum in the offshore requires an operating
licence and an authorization for the work or activity.29 To obtain the work
authorization, the licence holder must submit and obtain approval for its
development plan. The development plan must contain detailed and
technical information regarding the reservoir and its proposed reservoir
management plan sufficient to allow for a comprehensive review and
evaluation of the proposed development.3 0
2. Conservation Measures
The Accord Acts contain measures aimed at the conservation of oil and
gas. There are powerful provisions to prevent the continuance of waste
as defined under the Accord Acts. The Accord Acts also contain
provisions for the pooling and unitization of interest in the production of
oil or gas: While the AccordActs do not explicitly address the settling of
rights affected by drainage, these conservation measures may be used to
push these issues towards resolution.
One method of preventing waste where more than one person has an
interest in areservoir is to provide for pooling and unitization agreements.
The terms "pooling" and "unitization," though often used interchangeably,
have specific meanings. "Pooling" is generally considered in the industry
to be "the bringing together of small tracts sufficient for the granting of
a well permit."31 The principle of pooling is confined to rights within a
designated area, known as a spacing unit. In order to meet the drilling
spacing requirements under legislation, owners of oil and gas leases
covering areas smaller than the prescribed "spacing units" enter into
27. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., ss. 81-83; Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 80.
28. Nova Scotia AccordAct, ibid., s. 127; NewfoundlandAccord Act, ibid., s. 124 See Petro-
Canada v. Canada (Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board) (1995), 127 D.L.R.
(4th) 483, 133 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 91,413 A.P.R. 91 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.) and Mobil Oil Canada v.
Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (1990), 87 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 58 (Nfld
S.C.T.D.), aff'd (1992), 95 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 95 (Nfld. C.A.); cross-appeal by Board allowed,
appealby company disnissed, [1994J IS.C.R. 202,163 N.R. 27,115 Nfld. & P.E.LR. 334,360
A.P.R. 334, 111 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) for judicial consideration of the administrative law
principles which apply to the Boards when holding hearings into whether or not licences will
be granted.
29. Nova Scotia AccordAct, supra note 17, s. 140; NewfoundlandAccordAct, supra note 16,
s. 136.
30. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 143; Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 139.
31. C.T Mulldane & A.P.G Walker, "The Pooling Clause and the Effects of Unitization on
the Oil and Gas Lease" (1966) 4 Alta. L. Rev. 250.
134 The Dalhousie Law Journal
pooling agreements to recover the oil or gas.32 Pooling gives the mineral
owner whose correlative rights are threatened by drainage a legal right to
share in the recovery of the resource which is being drained.33
"Unitization" is considered to be "the bringing together of units
covering large field-wide or pool-wide unit areas or portions thereof.
34
The principle of unitization combines the interests throughout a pool
which covers more than one spacing unit. Unitization involves an
arrangement by owners of oil and gas rights in tracts overlying a common
pool so that the pool or field can be operated as a unit.3 When unitization
occurs, one of the unit owners undertakes to operate the unit on behalf of
all the owners, allocating the costs and profits accordingly.36
3. Pooling
Producers under the AccordActs cannot produce oil or gas if there are two
or more leases or separately owned working interests within a "spacing
unit" unless there is a pooling agreement in place.37 The Accord Acts
contain provisions for voluntary and mandatory pooling.
The impact of these provisions is uncertain as a result of the unclear
definition of "spacing unit" contained in the AccordActs. "Spacing unit"
is defined as "the area allocated to a well for the purpose of drilling for
or producing petroleum. '38 This definition neither describes precisely
the area of a spacing unit nor indicates how such area is to be ascertained.
Who allocates the area to a well for the purposes of drilling for or
producing petroleum? Under what statutory or regulatory authority is
this allocation made? It would appear that the powers to regulate the
production of offshore oil and gas which has been given to the Governor
in Council,31 together with the wide definition of spacing unit would
permit regulations to be made which govern these areas of concern.4'
32. Lucas & Hunt, supra note 15 at 202.
33. Lowe, supra note 9 at 27.
34. Mulldane & Walker, supra note 31 at 250.
35. Lucas & Hunt, supra note 15 at 215.
36. Lucas & Hunt, ibid. at 215.
37. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 17, s. 176(1); Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note
16, s. 171(1).
38. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 171; Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 166.
39. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 153 and s. 208; NewfoundlandAccordAct, ibid., s. 149
and s. 203.
40. For a discussion of this point as it pertained to the Oil and Gas Production and
Conservation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-4, s. 20 see O.L. Anderson, Oil and Gas Conservation on
Canada Lands (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 1985). Interestingly, the author
noted the failure to protect correlative rights as a troublesome aspect of this legislation which
was a precursor to the Accord Acts.
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Without a clear definition of "spacing unit" it is difficult to know when
two or more leases or two or more separately owned working interests
exist within a spacing unit. This deficiency in the legislation appears to
stem from a failure adequately to adapt pooling concepts contained in
other legislation when borrowing them for inclusion in the different
scheme for acquiring rights under the Accord Acts.41 The drafters of the
legislation can be forgiven for this oversight, committed at a time when
two or more drillers squabbling over entitlement to a producing pool
would have appeared to be a "high class" problem for these speculative
frontiers.
Voluntary pooling is contemplated under the Accord Acts. All the
working interest owners within a spacing unit, together with any royalty
owners, may by agreement pool their working and royalty interests in the
spacing unit for the purpose of drilling for or producing (or both drilling
for and producing) petroleum.42 The pooling agreement must be filed
with the Officer.43 The legislation also contemplates mandatory pooling
orders. A working interest owner in a spacing unit may apply for a
pooling order directing the working interest owners and the royalty
owners to pool their interests in the spacing unit for the purpose of drilling
for and producing, petroleum from the spacing unit.' The Committee
holds a hearing at which interested persons have an opportunity to be
heard before it makes such an order.
Orders for the pooling of interests must provide for the drilling and
operation of a well, the appointment of a working interest owner as an
operator to be responsible for said drilling, the allocation of shares in the
production of the petroleum, the payment of costs both in the event that
production occurs and that no production occurs, and for the sale by the
operator of the petroleum.45 The utility of these pooling provisions is
questionable because of the uncertain definition of "spacing unit" in the
Accord Acts.
41. In other jurisdictions, a spacing unit is defined with exact geographic detail or with
sufficient detail from which the boundaries of a spacing unit may be determined. For instance,
the Alberta legislation defines a drilling spacing unit for an oil well as one quarter section (160
acres) and for a gas well as one section (640 acres). Lucas & Hunt, supra note 15 at 200. It
is interesting to note that as of February 6, 2001 the average size of the area for which an
exploration licence was granted in the offshore of Nova Scotia was 122,433.4 hectares, online:
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board webpage <http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/Rights-
Management/EL_Info.html>.
42. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 17, s. 172(1); Newfoundland Accord Act, supra
note 16, s. 167(1).
43. Ibid.
44. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 173(1); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 168(1).
45. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 173(5); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 168(4).
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4. Unitization
The Accord Acts allow for unitization where there are multiple working
interest owners of a pool which exceeds the area of a spacing unit. As
"working interest" is defined as the right to produce or dispose of
petroleum from a pool or part of a pool,46 only persons holding a
production licence qualify as working interest owners. The definition of
"spacing unit" causes difficulty in interpreting the unitization provisions,
as it did in interpreting the pooling provisions of theAccordActs. The unit
area subject to unitization must be a pool or part of a pool that exceeds the
area of a spacing unit. While there is some uncertainty regarding what
constitutes a spacing unit, there are certain circumstances in which it
would appear safe to assume that a pool covers an area exceeding a
spacing unit. For instance, a pool straddling two or more production
licence areas where each licence holder has entitlement to drill a well
would appear to cover an area exceeding a spacing unit, however that
term may be interpreted.
Unitization may occur in three ways: voluntarily, as a result of the
Board's order on the application of the Officer, or as a result of the
Board's order on the application of the owners of 65 percent or more of
the working interests in a unit area. One or more working interest owners
in a pool, or part of a pool, exceeding a spacing unit in area may, together
with the royalty owners, enter into a unit agreement and operate their
interests pursuant to that agreement. 47 The only requirement is that a copy
of the agreement be filed with the Officer.48 Where such an agreement
designates one operator to be the agent of the parties to the agreement, the
performance or non-performance by that agent is deemed to be performance
or non-performance by all parties to the agreement.49
If the Officer is of the opinion that the unit operation of a pool or any
part thereof would prevent waste, the Officer may apply to the Committee
for an order requiring the working interest owners to enter into a unit
agreement and a unit operating agreement.50 When the Officer makes this
application, the Committee will hold a hearing to determine whether such
a unitization order should be made.51 If, following such a hearing, the
Committee determines that a unitization agreement is required, it may
issue an order that the working interest owners in that pool or part thereof
46. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 171; Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 166.
47. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 177(1); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 172(1).
48. Ibid.
49. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 177(3); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 172(3).
50. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 178(1); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 173(1).
51. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 178(2;) NewfoundlandAccordAct, ibid., s. 173(2).
Drainage Issues in the Atlantic Canada Offshore Petroleum Industry
enter into a unit agreement and unit operation agreements.52 If the parties
fail to do so within the specified time, the production of oil or gas from
that pool must cease until such agreements are reached and filed with the
Officer53 or unless otherwise authorized to continue said production.5 4
The Board can also grant unitization orders upon application by
working interest owners. Only those working interest owners who,
individually or collectively, are parties to a unit agreement and a unit
operating agreement and own in the aggregate 65 percent or more of the
working interest in a unit area may apply for an unitization order with
respect to the agreements.55 If these working interest owners are
successful, then the Committee may, following a hearing, order that the
agreement is a valid contract among all of the working or royalty interest
holders in that unit area. 6 To be successful, the working interest and
royalty owners must, in addition to proving that they do own 65 percent
of the interest in the unit area, prove that such an order would accomplish
more efficient or economical production of petroleum in the unit area.57
5. Prohibition of Waste
Under the Accord Acts waste is prohibited, and any person who commits
it may be found guilty of an offence. Waste is defined not only to include
its ordinary meaning and the meaning understood in the petroleum
industry, but also to include the following:
(a) the inefficient or excessive use or dissipation of reservoir energy;
(b) the locating, spacing or drilling of a well within afield or pool or within
part of a field or pool or the operating of any well that, having regard to
sound engineering and economic principles, results or tends to result in
a reduction in the quantity of petroleum ultimately recoverable from a
pool;
(c) the drilling, equipping, completing, operating or producing of any
well in a manner that causes or is likely to cause the unnecessary or
excessive loss or destruction of petroleum afterremoval from the reservoir;
(d) the inefficient storage of petroleum above gronnd or underground;
(e) theproduction ofpetroleumin excess of available storage, transportation
or marketing facilities;
(f) the escape or flaring of gas that could be economically recovered and
processed or economically injected into an underground reservoir; or
52. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 173(3); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 173(3).
53. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 173(4); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 173(4).
54. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 173(5); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 173(5).
55. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 179(1); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 174(1).
56. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 181(2); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 176(2).
57. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 181(2); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 176(2).
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(g) failure to use suitable artificial, secondary or supplementary recovery
methods in a pool when it appears that such methods would result in
increasing the quantity of petroleum ultimately recoverable under sound
engineering and economic principles.
If the Officer, on reasonable grounds, is of the opinion that waste is
being committed, he or she may order that all operations giving rise to
such waste cease until the Officer is satisfied that the waste has stopped. 8
In the event that the Officer believes it is necessary in order to prevent
damage to persons or property ,or to protect the environment, he or she
may make an order requiring all operations to be shut down prior to the
investigation, but the investigation must still occur following the
shutdown. 9 This power of the Officer cannot be exercised in relation to
waste resulting from a failure to utilize gas or a failure to use the
appropriate recovery methods.60 If this type of waste is suspected, the
Officer can apply to the Committee for an order, and only the Committee
can order the stoppage of this type of waste.61
The Officer has power to issue production orders requiring
commencement, continuation or increase in the production of petroleum
to stop waste.62 To prevent waste he or she can authorize such persons as
are necessary to enter the premises and take over management and control
of the operations which are giving rise to the waste.63  Any costs
associated with such management are borne by the person who holds the
permit with a lease to produce the resource.
If waste resulting from a failure to utilize gas or a failure to use the
appropriate recovery methods is found by the Committee, then the
Committee may order the introduction of a scheme for the collection,
processing, disposition or re-injection of any gas produced from such a
pool, or it may direct maintenance for the pool or direct the injection of
gas, water or any other substance into the pool. 64
In addition to the remedies discussed above, charges may be brought
for committing waste.6  The prosecution of any person accused of
committing waste may only be instituted with the consent of the Board.
It is important to note that no person can be deemed to have committed
58. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 160(1); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 155(1).
59. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 160(3); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 155(3).
60. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 159(2)(f) or (g); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s.
154(2)(f) or (g).
61. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 163(l); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 163(1).
62. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 158; Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 153.
63. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 161(1); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 156(1).
64. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 164(1); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 159(1).
65. Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 199(5); Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 194(1).
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the offence of waste for a failure to utilize gas or to use appropriate
recovery methods unless that person has been ordered by the Committee
to take measures to prevent the waste and has failed to comply.
6. Protection of Correlative Rights
The Accord Acts contain no provisions explicitly designed to address the
protection of correlative rights. Drainage is dealt with as a conservation
concern for which there are a variety of regulatory mechanisms available.
Without judicial or administrative precedents regarding the balancing of
correlative rights in the offshore, it is useful to examine the Alberta
experience concerning these issues.
III. Alberta Regime
Protection of correlative rights under Alberta statutory and regulatory
regimes is a fundamentally different exercise than in offshore areas. It is
a simpler process, because the underlying land tenure process is more
straightforward. It is, at the same time, more complex, because of the
variety of regulatory processes that come into play in a maturing area of
energy production, such as the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin.
Despite the differences in basin (and regulatory) maturity and land
tenure, there are, nonetheless, some lessons to be learned from the Alberta
experience for offshore energy producers. 66
1. Land Tenure
In Alberta, the procedures used for the acquisition of the right to produce
oil or gas from an area depends on whether the rights are held privately
or by the Crown. In the case of freehold lands, mineral rights flowed,
initially, to the fee simple landowner, and have subsequently been subject
to disposition on the open market. After 1930, mineral rights were
reserved to the provincial Crown, as and when new land parcels were
created. Those rights have been subject to the provincial land sales
process, wherein petroleum and natural gas (P&NG) rights are posted for
"sale", and bid upon by energy companies or their agents. This takes the
form of an initial exploration licence, followed by the issuance of
standard form P&NG leases following the drilling of a qualifying well.67
On a conceptual basis, the issuance of land tenure for public lands
under Alberta legislation is therefore similar (albeit, less complex) than
under federal and offshore regimes. An initial right to explore is obtained
66. For an interesting review of industry and regulatory development in Alberta and the
myriad issues impacting thereon, the reader is referred to D.H. Breen, Alberta's Petroleum
Industry and the Conservation Board, (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1993).
67. For a more complete description, see Lucas & Hunt, supra note 15 at 9-11.
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through bidding, followed by conversion of that interest to a "lease"
following the discovery of commercial reserves.
2. Drainage Remedies
The basic remedy available to an Alberta company whose reserves are
being drained by an off-setting well is self-help. That is, to drill a
competing well with the objective of not only preventing migration of
reserves to the offsetting producer, but also reversing the situation in
one's favour. In one notoriously competitive portion of Alberta, that
development scenario is known as "Straw Wars."
Alberta law and regulatory practice acknowledges and, in some
respects, even encourages such aggressive behaviour. For example, the
Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (EUB or Board) has long held that
drainage of off-setting lands is not undesirable per se, as it is a natural
consequence of a competitive industry and the rule ofcapture." Moreover,
exploration success is rewarded following the drilling of a successful
exploration well, through measures such as conferring confidential status
on all well data for one year following completion, and waiving off-target
penalties for the first well in a pool.
Regulatory relief is available, however, where the drainage is
"inequitable," or where the production practice resulting in the drainage
results in conservation losses. Because the public interest in maximizing
the amount of energy recovered from a pool is sometimes congruent with
the off-setting owner's desire to impede the rate of drainage from a pool,
conservation measures can, therefore, occasionally be pursued as a
surrogate for drainage relief. In the ensuing portion of this article, we will
describe the regulatory remedies available in Alberta for both types of
situations.
3. Relieffrom "Inequitable" Drainage
One of the primary differences between Alberta and offshore legislation
is Alberta's explicit recognition of correlative rights, as one of the
enumerated purposes of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act.69 Section 4 of
the OGCA provides:
The purposes of this Act are
(a) to effect the conservation of, and to prevent the waste of, the oil and
gas resources of Alberta;
68. Eagle Exploration, Application for Common Purchaser Declaration, Bruce Viking A
Pool (1977), D 77-25 (EUB).
69. R.S.A. 1980, c. 0-5 [hereinafter OGCA].
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(b) to secure the observance of safe and efficient practices in the locating,
spacing, drilling, equipping, constructing, completing, reworking, testing,
operating, maintenance, repair, suspension and abandonment of wells and
facilities and in operations for the production of oil and gas;
(c) to provide for the economic, orderly and efficient development in the
public interest of the oil and gas resources of Alberta;
(d) to afford each owner the opportunity of obtaining his share of the
production of oil or gas from any pool;70
(e) to provide for the recording and the timely and useful dissemination
of information regarding the oil and gas resources of Alberta;
(f) to control pollution above, at or below the surface in the drilling of
wells and in operations for the production of oil and gas and in other
operations over which the Board has jurisdiction.
The OGCA contains a number of provisions that afford a party that is
being deprived by circumstances beyond its control the opportunity to
produce its share of production from a pool.7 1 These situations have
sometimes been referred to as instances of "inequitable" drainage.
Among these remedies are: common carrier declarations, common
processor declarations, common purchaser declarations, and rateable
take orders.
A 1969 article by C.H. Hebb72 discussing common carrier, common
purchaser and common processor orders has been partly summarized as
follows:
These orders are intended to ensure that every holder of oil and gas rights
has an opportunity to secure a fair share of the benefits from the resource.
The objective is the mitigation of inequities produced by the rule of capture
in the context of particular contractual arrangements and physical
circumstances, including reservoir characteristics and production facilities.
Common purchaser, carrier and processor orders extend the principle of
entitlement to a fair share of resources beyond mere access to the
hydrocarbons to include the opportunity to have the oil and gas transported,
purchased or processed. Without the benefit of these orders, a rights holder
without access to markets would be vulnerable to drainage by other
producers in the same pool who have marketing arrangements.
73
70. Contrast this explicit objective with the more oblique stated purpose of the Accord Acts
"to promote.., joint production arrangements." Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 17, s.
138.1; Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 16, s. 135.1 [emphasis added].
71. OGCA, supra note 69, s. l(1)(q) defines "pool" as "a natural underground reservoir
containing or appearing to contain an accumulation of oil or gas or both separated or appearing
to be separated from any other such accumulation."
72. C.H. Hebb, "Common Carrier, Common Purchaser and Common Processor Orders"
(1969) 7 Alta. L. Rev. 436.
73. Supra note 1 at 30-3196.
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Clearly, these orders represent a significant protection for rights
holders who, under the pure rule of capture and related concepts, may be
treated inequitably by other rights holders. Indeed, by these orders, "the
opportunity for every person to secure a fair share of the oil or gas beneath
his land is effectively correlated with all other producers in the Province
of Alberta.
74
Traditionally, the criteria for obtaining such relief from the Board have
included demonstrating that (1) drainage of reserves is taking place (or at
least that there is a high probability of drainage); (2) drainage is taking
place because of constraints in processing capacity (in the case of
common processor applications), pipeline capacity (for common carrier
applications), or gas markets (for common purchaser applications); (3)
the applicant has made reasonable efforts to reach a negotiated, commercial
solution; and, (4) no other economic alternative exists (e.g., use of
another gas processing plant).75
Recently, the common processor remedy was expanded to include a
situation where the processing fee demanded by the plant operator was in
excess of normal industry practice.76 For the most part, however,
drainage has been considered to be a necessary prerequisite to the
granting of these remedies.
4. Rateable Take of Gas Orders
While originally framed as a gas conservation mechanism, rateable take
orders have, over the years, evolved as a mechanism for allocating
production of natural gas from a common pool on a "fair share" basis.
Section 23 of the OGCA provides:
The Board may, by order, restrict
(a) the amount of gas, or
(b) where gas is produced in association with oil, the amount of gas and
oil, that may be produced during a period defined in the order from a pool
in Alberta, and the restriction may be imposed by either or both of the
following means:
(c) by limiting, if the limitation appears to be necessary, the total amount
of gas that may be produced from the pool orpart ofthepool, having regard
to the demand for gas from the pool or to the efficient use of gas for the
production of oil, or to both of those considerations;
74. Supra note 72 at 442.
75. Oil and Gas Conservation Regulations, Alta. Reg. 151/71, as am., ss. 15.005, 15.010,
15.020, 15.021 and 15.022.
76. Rider Resources Inc., Common Processor Pembina Field (1997), D 97-02 (EUB).
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(d) by distributing the amount of gas that may be produced from the pool
or part of the pool in an equitable manner among the wells or groups of
wells in the pool for the purpose of giving each well owner the opportunity
of receiving his share of gas in the pool. (emphasis added)
The predecessor of s. 23 contained significantly different wording.
It stated that:
23. The Board, after a public hearing, may, by order, restrict the amount
of gas and oil produced in association with gas that may be produced
during a period defined in the order from a pool within Alberta
(a) by limiting, if the limitation appears necessary, the total amount of gas
that may be produced from the pool, having regard to the efficient use of
gas for the production of oil and to the demand for gas from the pool, and
(b) by distributing the amount of gas that may be produced from the pool
in an equitable manner among the wells in the pool for the purpose of
giving each well owner the opportunity of producing or receiving his share
of the gas in the pool.
Under the old wording, it was argued that in order for a rateable take
order to issue, whereby gas production was allocated between wells in a
pool, there must first be a conservation reason to restrict pool production
to a particular level. The Board disagreed, holding that it could restrict
production in a pool in order to allocate it fairly among producing wells .7
The OGCA was later amended to codify the practice of the Board, and to
remove uncertainty regarding the Board' s jurisdiction to order allocation
of production with or without a preceding limitation on total pool
production.
That a rateable take order can be sought as a drainage remedy (as
opposed to being a gas conservation measure), is clear from the statute,
and even clearer from the Oil and Gas Conservation Regulations.
Section 15.005 sets out the information required of an applicant in such
case, and includes the following:
15.005 An application under section 23 of the Act for an order limiting
the total amount of gas that may be produced from a pool or distributing
the amount of gas that may be produced from a pool in an equitable manner
among the wells in a pool shall include
(f) where drainage is alleged, a discussion of drainage including
(i) evidence showing that the applicant's well is being drained
subsequent to the completion of the well in the pool,
(ii) estimates of the present rate of drainage and the expected future
rate of drainage, and
77. Suncor Inc., Rateable Take Application Rosevear Beaverhill Lake A Pool (1985), D 85-
11 (ERCB).
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(iii) an estimate of the total amount of drainage that has occurred
since the well was completed in the pool, including where appropriate
(A) the details of the gas purchase contracts, or
(B) the situation which, in the applicant's opinion, has led or will lead to
an inequitable situation, and
(iv) documents showing the applicant's attempts to negotiate a
resolution of the problem ....
Despite the broad wording of s. 23 of the OGCA, and s. 15.005 of the
Oil and Gas Conservation Regulations, the EUB has not been called upon
to consider a plethora of rateable take applications. There are a number
of reasons for this. First, the primary response to drainage by a competitor
is to drill or recomplete one's own well, so as to compete for production
from the pool. Second, there is no guarantee that the EUB would view
drainage by a competitor, in the absence of circumstances addressed via
the common processor/carrier/purchaser remedies (or other unusual
situations), to be inequitable. Thus, even if one could show that a
competitor's well might recover gas originating on lands held by others,
success in a rateable take application might still be elusive. Third,
rateable take orders (unlike common processor/carrier/purchaser orders)
are not retroactive to the date of application. Thus, the time required to
marshal evidence of drainage, establish a track record of negotiations to
rectify the situation, apply to the EUB, participate in a contested hearing,
and await issuance of a decision, may make the availability of regulatory
relief an ineffective remedy in some instances.
5. Drainage and Conservation
In a competitive situation, whenever production of a well is either delayed
or restricted, other owners of other wells in the pool stand to benefit. Like
taxes, drainage deferred is drainage avoided. In that context, any statutory
provision that modifies the right to produce is a potential drainage remedy
for an off-setting owner. For example, an approval as simple as a licence
to drill can be used as an opportunity to present or pursue drainage
concerns. This is particularly the case where a well licence applicant
proposes an off-target bottom hole location. The drainage issue can also
underlie, orbe squarely addressed, in respect of applications for approvals
of gas processing facilities,78 oil or gas pipelines,79 gas cycling
78. Dome Petroleum Ltd., Rateable Take Application, Pouce Coupe Kiskatinaw D Pool
(1980), D 88-8 (ERCB).
79. Dome Petroleum Ltd., Petro-Canada Inc., Amoco Canada Petroleum Ltd., Gas Cycling
Applications Brazeau River Nisku P Pool (1987), D-87-7 (ERCB).
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(conservation) schemes,"° applications for special spacing units (either
reduced or enlarged).8 '
By engaging the public hearing process, a company whose reserves are
under the threat of drainage may be able to forestall drainage losses, or
enhance its commercial leverage to achieve a negotiated solution. The
challenge for east coast developers will be to find similar opportunities
within the context of the AccordActs, and to do so by advancing positions
that can be credibly supported under a fair reading of the legislation.
6. Compulsory Pooling and Unitization
Alberta legislation requires that only one well can be drilled and produced
within a drilling spacing unit (DSU) at one time. 2 The reason for this
requirement, and the underlying statutory or regulatory provisions
establishing DSUs and target areas within those DSUs, are numerous.
They include environmental/surface considerations, economic efficiency,
conservation of resources, and protection of correlative rights. 3
Having made the threshold decision to prescribe DSUs and limit the
number of wells to be drilled within one, Alberta had two options open
to it to address the issue of correlative rights among different owners
within the DSU. The first would be to do nothing, and leave the
determination of how the costs and proceeds of drilling are to be allocated
to market forces and the common law. The second avenue was to provide
a mechanism for the compulsory pooling of ownership interests (or
"tracts") within the DSU. In 1959, Alberta took the latter route, providing
an avenue to resolution among those landowners unable to reach a
negotiated pooling solution.
Section 13 of the OGCA stipulates that, in order to apply for a well
licence, an applicant must show that it is entitled to the right to produce
oil or gas from the well. Because s. 12 of the statute prevents more than
one well per DSU, the Board has interpreted s. 13 as meaning that in order
to receive a well licence, there must be common ownership of all tracts
within a DSU, either through pooling or otherwise.14
Because DSUs are statutorily prescribed, and common ownership of
a DSU is a prerequisite to a well licence, the compulsory pooling
provisions of the OGCA do not fall within the category of a drainage
80. Ibid.
81. Alberta DepartmentofEnergy Application to Rescind Spacing Unit Orders (1990), D 90-
11 (ERCB).
82. OGCA, supra note 69, s. 12.
83. For a comprehensive discussion, see, e.g., R. Harrison, "Regulation of Well Spacing in
Oil and Gas Production" (1970) Alta. L. Rev. 357; N. Bankes, "Compulsory Pooling Under the
Oil and Gas Conservation Act of Alberta" (1997), 35 Alta. L. Rev. 945.
84. Blue Range Resources Ltd., Application to Amend WellLicence (1990), D 90-12 (ERCB).
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remedy, except to the extent that they deal with different ownership
positions within the DSU itself. They do, however, allow the owner of
a partial interest to use compulsory pooling to "form a DSU" in order to
compete with other wells operated by a company having disproportionate
interests in adjoining lands.
An example of this situation occurred recently in the southwestern
foothills of Alberta. Canadian 88 Energy Corporation (Canadian 88)
owned the P&NG gas rights to three-quarters of a section of land. P&NG
rights to the northwest quarter were held by Shell Canada Ltd. (Shell) and
Imperial Oil Ltd. (IOL) who also owned offsetting lands to the north and
west of the subject section, and which were the subject of well licence
applications. To protect its reserves from drainage by wells being
proposed by the other two companies, Canadian 88 applied for a competing
well. Its application was preceded by negotiations in respect of a
voluntary pooling and, when those failed, was accompanied by a
compulsory pooling application.
Within the context of the pooling negotiations and regulatory dispute,
Shell and IOL argued that pooling of the section on an acreage or areal
basis would result in inequitable drainage within the DSU because their
quarter section contained a disproportionate volume of gas-in-place. At
a prehearing conference, IOL also argued that the Canadian 88 well
licence application was patently deficient since, at the time of applying,
Canadian 88 had not completed the pooling of the DSU and, consequently,
was not entitled to apply for a well licence. The EUB responded to the IOL
jurisdictional argument by setting the compulsory pooling application
down for hearing on an expedited basis, and in advance of the hearing of
the various well licence applications. 5 As it turned out, the compulsory
pooling hearing was unnecessary, because a voluntary pooling agreement
was reached. The well licence applications proceeded to hearing, and
were granted.86
The Canadian 88/Shell/IOL dispute is an example of a case where
drainage is not front and centre as an issue per se, but, nonetheless,
motivates the various commercial and regulatory strategies pursued by
the companies involved. One can reasonably expect that, as offshore
development matures, similar types of situations will arise. Indeed, as
long as the Accord Acts do not afford any direct forms of relief from
inequitable drainage, companies seeking to prevent such drainage from
85. Shell Canada Ltd., Canadian 88 Energy Corporation, Prehearing Meeting (1999),
Memorandum of Decision 1999-11-10 (EUB).
86. Canadian 88 Energy Corp., Application to Drill a Critical Sour Gas Well and Construct
a Pipeline and Related Facilities Castle River Area (2000), D 2000-18 (EUB).
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taking place will need to be even more vigilant in scrutinizing the
regulatory activities of others.
7. Forced Unitization
Unitization involves the creation of a common entity for the purpose of
ownership and operation of oil and gas production in an area extending
well beyond a typical DSU. The Alberta OGCA contains a series of
provisions empowering the EUBto compulsorily unitize lands. However,
these provisions have not been proclaimed. What is left, then, is simply
a duty to "encourage"87 unitization, rather than the authority to impose it.
While the EUB has on many occasions expressed support for the
concept of unitization, its lack ofjurisdiction to directly compel unitization
has left aggrieved producers to pursue more oblique regulatory strategies
where pools extend beyond the boundaries of traditional DSUs. For gas
pools, one such remedy has been the rateable take remedy discussed
earlier. In the case of small gas pools involving only a few sections of
land, a bolder and more direct approach would be to apply for a special,
enlarged drilling spacing unit encompassing all sections within the pool.
The statutory basis for such an application would be s. 4.040 of the Oiland
Gas ConservationRegulations.8 It sets out the criteria for such application
as follows:
(1) Notwithstanding sections 4.020 and 4.030, the Board may prescribe
special drilling spacing units which may differ from norrhal drilling
spacing units in size, shape or target area.
(2) An application for an order pursuant to subsection (1) shall conform
to the provisions of section 15.160 concerning such applications.
(3) The Board shall not grant an application for an order pursuant to
subsection (1) that would reduce the size of drilling spacing units to less
than the size of normal drilling spacing units unless the applicant shows
that
(a) improved recovery will be obtained,
(b) additional wells are necessary to provide capacity to drain the
pool at a reasonable rate that will not adversely affect the recovery
from the pool,
(c) the drilling spacing units would be in a pool in a substantial part
of which there are drilling spacing units of such reduced size, or
(d) in a gas field, increased deliverability is desirable.
87. OGCA, supra note 69, s. 71(1).
88. Alta. Reg. 151/71, as am.
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(4) The Board may prescribe for an approved oil sands scheme or after
publication of notice, for an experimental scheme
(a) special drilling spacing units as to size, shape and target area,
or
(b) an area not having any specific drilling spacing units as to size,
shape or target area within which wells may be drilled.
Special DSUs are commonplace in the heavy oil sector, where the
normal 160 acre DSU often does not facilitate optimal recovery of
resources. It is, nonetheless, clear, that the special DSU provisions also
apply to enlarged DSUs to facilitate gas production. In fact, an extensive
Decision Report89 was issued by the Board in 1990 dealing with an
application by the Alberta Department of Energy to rescind long-
standing orders prescribing two section DSUs for the Pembina and West
Rose areas. The Board discussed its mandate as foflows:
1.2 Basis for Establishment of Special DSUs
The Board believes the fundamental reason for the establishment of
Special DSUs is to provide flexibility in well spacing and target areas,
thereby allowing for efficient and economic development of resources
under variable topographical, geological, or reservoir conditions.
In the Board's view, the considerations relevant to establishing Special
DSUs are generally as follows:
* Resource conservation, that is, whether the proposed special spacing
would affect the recovery of the resource.
" Economics and efficiency, that is, whether altered facilities could
effectively recover the resources, such that the economics of the
special spacing were more favourable than the economics of standard
spacing.
* Equity, that is, whether the special spacing wouldhave any unacceptable
effects on another party's opportunity to recover it share of the
resource.
" Land use, that is, whether the proposed special spacing would have
significant effects on land surface use.
" Land tenure policy, that is, whether the proposed special spacing
would be contrary to the intent of the legislation governing land
tenure.
A relatively common reason for requesting a larger-than-normal DSU
is to obtain off-target penalty relief. In such situations, the above issues
would be considered, and economic efficiency, resource conservation,
and equity would be critical factors. Although frequently used to deal
with off-target wells, special spacing is not intended as a tool to prevent
normal competitive operations. Also, where there is insufficient data to
89. Supra note 81.
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establish the geological productive characteristics of a pool, the Board
would normally maintain the standard size of spacing unit for the area.
To date, there have been no applications in which an enlarged DSU has
been sought as a precursor to a multi-section pooling application. Clearly,
the party resisting such a strategy would argue that it constitutes an
attempt to have the Board do indirectly that which it cannot do directly
(compulsory unitization). The applicant would likely respond by asserting
that discretion is vested in the EUB to prescribe abnormally-sized spacing
units under the OGCA and, consequently, such an application is both
authorized and intended under the Act. How the Board would decide is
a matter of conjecture. Existing EUB precedent and policies, such as
those articulated above, could, nevertheless, be useful in the offshore or
federal setting in the course of establishing criteria for establishing
drilling spacing units or considering whether to grant a unitization
application.
Conclusion
There are a number of differences between the Alberta and offshore areas
that affect the commercial or regulatory remedies that may be available
to a party whose reserves are being drained. These include the larger,
more expensive scale of drilling operations in the offshore, different
mechanisms for granting land tenure, and different statutory regimes.
The Alberta experience is, nevertheless, relevant and instructive.
Cases decided by the EUB and its predecessor boards deal with a wide
variety of disputes that had, at their root, the desire to prevent (or delay)
drainage by a competitor. These include, but are not limited to, decisions
involving the drainage remedies of common carrier, common processor
and common purchaser. A careful review of Alberta precedent will assist
offshore companies in devising regulatory strategies in response to
drainage concerns, even though the same remedies may not now be
available.
The AccordActs do not explicitly address the settling of the correlative
rights of persons interested in the same reservoir. The Board' sjurisdiction
to interfere with the exercise of a working interest owner's right to enjoy
production pursuant to the rule of capture is based upon its conservation
mandate of preventing waste, rather than an equitable mandate to do
justice between the parties. The Alberta experience suggests that
competitors will invoke this conservation mandate of the Board to protect
their interests and seek relief not strictly based upon conservation
considerations.
The Board may be called upon to deal with such applications as matters
of urgency and importance. To obtain amendments to the AccordActs or
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to pass regulations under the Accord Acts so as to provide clearer
direction to the Board and interest holders is likely a lengthy process as
it involves the relationships of the federal government and two provinces.
Legislative inertia may influence the Board to interpret its jurisdiction
broadly.
The approach to these issues adopted by the Board may provide a
number of opportunities for companies concerned with the prospect of
drainage to protect their positions. For example, a broad interpretation of
"waste" that included economic waste due to inefficiency could serve to
invoke the various conservation-related powers under the Accord Acts.
Similarly, it could be argued that the Board may require a development
plan filed for approval under the Accord Acts to provide mechanisms for
facilitating the efficient, economic and orderly production of reserves -
including resolution of drainage concerns other than the drilling of
unnecessary wells or the construction of unnecessary gathering lines and
processing facilities.
The commercial discovery declaration and hearing process may also
be invoked in an attempt to provide protection against drainage.
Applications for commercial discovery area declarations (and preceding
significant discovery area declarations) should be followed carefully by
adjacent interest holders. How the regulatory authorities might address
concerns of adjacent interest holders is a matter of conjecture. The
Alberta experience has shown, however, that if appropriately structured,
regulatory action can provide some measure of drainage protection - if
only to the extent of buying time to pursue self-help via competitive
operations.
